In a thrilling encounter last Sunday, PSG came out on top 2:3 against Lyon. This game not only had a large amount of goals, but it was also a thrilling tactical battle. So how did PSG manage to get a brilliant result at the Groupama Stadium?

PSG set up in their usual 4-3-3 formation off the ball, but on the ball it converted to a 3-2-5. Nuno Mendes tucked in to create a back 3, while Hakimi bombed forward and virtually played as a right winger. Kvaratskhelia inverted and played closer to the middle, while Barcola, on the other side, played wide and high. This created an overload in the midfield for PSG, where they frequently managed to find the attacking midfielders in the half spaces. Lyon, anticipating this formation from PSG, defended very narrowly, with the midfield 3 playing very closely together attempting to cut out passes towards the Parisian attackers. Moreover, when PSG crept closer to Lyon’s box, Matic dropped into the backline to create a back five, which created further complications for PSG to carve Lyon open. Joao Neves and Doué acknowledged this tactic from Lyon pretty quickly, and in attempt to find space, tended to drift wide between PSG’s center backs and wingers.

Lyon, knew that PSG would dominate possession, and they themselves up in a 4-3-3 formation. Their defensive line was relatively high, in order to compact the midfield space, so that the PSG midfielders didn’t have much time to pick their heads up and find a pass out wide, where the PSG wingers were in acres of space. With this defensive shape, Lyon conceded space out wide, with the PSG wingers frequently being in large amounts of space. But by compacting the midfield and limiting space for the PSG midfielders, PSG rarely found balls out wide. This defensive formation worked very well in the first half for Lyon, however, on the ball they infrequently managed to maintain possession, which pilled the pressure on the back line.

In possession, Lyon played in a 4-2-2-2 formation. The back line and the CDM’s played in their usual positions, Cherki, on the other hand, playing as a center forward, dropped very low and played alongside Tolisso to create a box midfield. The two wingers played very high, in order to push the PSG backline back and create space for the Lyon midfielders. In theory this is a good tactical decision from Fonseca, but PSG simply needed to force the ball out wide, where the wing backs would be isolated because the two Lyon wingers played very high. Lyon tried to play out the back the first few times, but quickly understood they were playing into a trap. Therefore, Lyon resorted to kick the ball long, but with a lack of height up top, PSG recovered possession of the ball and continuously set up attacks.

The second half started as the first half ended, with PSG on top and controlling possession. Lyon still struggled to play out and find their dangerous attacking players. It didn’t take long for PSG to score the first goal, and once they scored the first, the second came not long after. In response, to conceding two goals, Fonseca subbed on Almada and Lacazette. These substitutions helped Lyon immensely in regards to keeping possession, as Almada is a much more technically adept player than Matic, and having a focal point in attack, in Lacazette, helped as the veteran forward was used as a springboard, where they would play to his feet and he would bounce the ball back to the open midfielder. These substitutions were immense in Lyon’s surge in the second half, as they has more possession and created better chances.

In the end, Lyon managed to get two goals back, but it wasn’t enough as Dembélé scored his second goal in the 85th minute. This made me think, whether Fonseca should’ve subbed on Almada and Lacazette earlier, or even started with them two. It seems as if Fonseca gave PSG too much respect, which hurt them in the end.