In the second leg of the Caraboa Cup semi- final, City ran riot at home against a weakened Newcastle side. This post will examine the initial tactical approaches of both teams, as well as the in-game adjustments made by each manager.

To begin with, the home side lined up in an unusual 4-2-2-2 system, with O’Reilly and Nico operating in deeper roles, while Foden and Reijnders occupied the half-spaces. One of the biggest shocks when the line-ups were announced was Haaland’s omission from the squad, and this quickly became evident from the opening minutes. City’s two forwards frequently drifted wide, almost functioning as half-wingers, to stretch Newcastle’s back three—an approach that does not suit Haaland’s skill set.

Out of possession, City pressed Newcastle aggressively high up the pitch, deliberately funneling play wide where Newcastle had fewer options. This strategy aimed to force errors close to Newcastle’s goal or compel them to play long.

Newcastle, by contrast, set up in a 5-2-1-2 shape. In possession, their game plan was clear: circulate the ball to the wing-backs, draw City’s wing-backs forward to press, and then exploit the space created through underlapping runs from Woltemade, Gordon, and Willock between the advancing City wing-backs and the centre-backs. Willock’s big chance shortly after City’s opening goal illustrated this approach perfectly.

What caught my attention early on, particularly in relation to Newcastle’s attacking play, was their build-up structure. While Newcastle typically build in a back four, their use of a back three in the previous match meant they needed to recreate that familiar back-four shape for continuity. To do so, they borrowed an idea straight from Guardiola’s playbook, using Ramsdale as a centre-back in possession.

In this structure, Botman and Ramsdale formed the central pairing, while Burn and Thiaw operated as false full-backs. This allowed Trippier and Hall to push very high up the pitch, effectively functioning as wingers. As a result, City found it more difficult to press high and regain possession close to Newcastle’s goal.

Behind them, Ramsey and Tonali held deeper positions to track City’s attacking midfielders. This left Newcastle’s back three responsible for city’s 2 forwards, creating a 3v2 favoring the away side.

As the first half drew to a close, it became increasingly clear that Guardiola’s tactical approach had outmanoeuvred Howe’s. This raises the question: what went wrong for Eddie Howe in the opening period?

Firstly, City’s use of two holding midfielders against Newcastle’s single attacking midfielder consistently created central overloads, allowing City to bypass the press with ease. O’Reilly repeatedly found himself in space, with both time and freedom to turn and play forward.

The issue was compounded by Newcastle’s pressing instructions. Ramsey, who initially was tasked with marking Reijnders in a deeper position, frequently vacated his role to step out and press O’Reilly higher up the pitch. However, because this pressure was neither early nor aggressive enough, it simply allowed O’Reilly to turn and play a simple 15-yard pass into Reijnders—now unmarked after Ramsey had left his position. Reijnders was then able to drive forward or release runners such as Marmoush or Sementó with acres of space to exploit. City’s first and third goals both stemmed directly from this structural flaw in Newcastle’s pressing.

A more effective solution would have been for Ramsey to engage O’Reilly initially, while Botman stepped out to press Reijnders. While this adjustment would have left Newcastle in a 2v2 at the back, it would have significantly reduced City’s ability to play through their press.

More broadly, Newcastle lacked the required intensity and compactness in their defensive work. They were neither tight nor aggressive enough on City’s midfielders and forwards, allowing City to progress through intricate combinations with relative ease. Newcastle’s work rate was also below the necessary level, with players frequently losing their markers. On several occasions, City attackers made runs in behind, only for Newcastle defenders to make delayed or half-hearted recovery efforts, tightening up only once it became obvious the ball was being played to their direct opponent.

Newcastle emerged for the second half with far greater intensity and a much clearer tactical plan. Abandoning their earlier halfway press, they adopted a strict man-to-man approach and pressed City aggressively, which City struggled to cope with for the opening 25 minutes of the half. Newcastle also shifted from a 5-2-1-2 to a 5-2-3, a change that not only supported the high press but also created attacking overloads out wide, where they consistently threatened City’s full-backs which resulted in Newcastle’s sole goal.

This approach proved highly effective until Guardiola responded with a series of substitutions. Pep recognised that Newcastle’s revised shape was forcing City to play more direct, and without a physical presence in the forward line, City were losing possession too easily and allowing Newcastle to launch quick subsequent attacks. To address this, Guardiola introduced Haaland to provide a focal point up front. He also brought on Rodri to regain control, slow the tempo, and improve City’s ability to retain possession. Rodri’s presence also freed City’s attacking midfielders to roam more fluidly and find space in the channels.

Rodri quickly imposed himself on the match, prompting Howe to make tactical adjustments of his own. Newcastle reverted to their original 5-2-1-2 shape but dropped into a mid-block rather than maintaining a high press. This change was designed to limit passing lanes into Rodri and reduce the spaces available in the half-spaces. While this adjustment succeeded in diminishing City’s attacking threat, it also blunted Newcastle’s own attacking intent. As a result, the final 15 minutes became largely uneventful, with the match effectively drifting toward its conclusion.

Despite the one-sided nature of the scoreline, the tactical ideas and in-game adjustments from both managers made for an intriguing contest. One lingering question is whether the outcome might have been different had Newcastle started in a 5-2-3. It seemed Howe was weighing up multiple approaches before kick-off, but ultimately opted for the less effective one. Ultimately, the match served as a clear reminder of the fine tactical margins at the highest level. Guardiola’s ability to identify problems in-game and correct them decisively once again proved decisive, while Newcastle’s second-half response showed there is still tactical flexibility and potential within Howe’s side. For Newcastle, the challenge moving forward will be translating promising ideas into sustained execution from the opening whistle—because against teams like City, even a brief tactical misstep can be terminal.